Beyond rationality: images as guide-lines to choice by Patalano Roberta






Via Po, 53 – 10124 Torino (Italy) 







WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 








Dipartimento di Economia “S. Cognetti de Martiis” 
 
Centro di Studi sulla Storia e i Metodi dell’Economia Politica  














Università di Torino  
 
BEYOND RATIONALITY: IMAGES AS  GUIDE-LINES TO CHOICE 
 
Roberta Patalano 
University of Rome “La Sapienza” and  




Abstract: in this paper I will discuss a representation of the decision-making process that is based 
on images production, exploration and exploitation, in order to propose theoretical refinement of 
the link  between decisional behaviour and mental images in economic contexts. To do so, I will 
start by shortly presenting  Beach and Mitchell’s model (1987).  I will  then extend it to economics, 
by comparing its implications with those deriving from two more traditional approaches, both the 
neoclassical one and those recently derived from Simon’s bounded rationality theory. The most 
significant consequences of an image-based model appear to be: i) wider cognitive foundations for 
the decision process; ii) the need to extend the concept of rationality by enlarging its relationship 
with that of imagination; iii) a new and fuller “image” of the economic agent. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Traditionally, the economic analysis of decision processes has been dominated  by two theoretical 
paradigms, the neoclassical one whose mathematical foundations were originally proposed by 
Arrow and Debreu (1954), and the one started by Simon’s contributions on bounded rationality and 
problem-solving (1947; 1955; 1956; 1957; 1981; 2000). They have both been enriched and 
extended  in the last three decades. 
As well-known in the Arrow-Debreu world rationality is identified with a methodological strategy 
that consists of solving maximization problems. The representative agent’s decision process can be 
broken down into three logical steps (to simplify, we do not take any time dimension or uncertainty 
structure into consideration): he draws a list of all the possible decisional options; he figures out the 
consequences of any option; he then compares these expected implications and chooses the option 
whose consequences maximize his utility. 
Simon has strongly criticised this approach by pointing out the binding and unrealistic hypothesis 
on which it depends. It requires complete and perfect information, while the last turns out to be usually only partial, not without cost and not even always detectable. It is calibrated on a 
representative agent with unlimited computational and predictional abilities, while the human mind, 
and even expert systems, face serious structural limitations to their “power”. Due to the intrinsic 
limitations, human mind performances cannot fit the standards of such “olympic” perfection and 
consequently the economic agent, when faced with a problem, will find solutions commonly not 
optimal but “satisficing” according to his subjective and modifiable aspiration level. 
Within Simon’s contributions, once the need to study the decision-making process in 
interdisciplinary terms by integrating results achieved in economics, cognitive psychology, 
neurobiology and artificial intelligence is understood, the exploration of the psychological 
dimension in economics has been forwarded at different depth levels (Devetag 1996). 
Experimental studies, mainly initiated by Kahneman e Tversky (1979; 1986; 1992), appear to be 
innovative for many aspects but are still challenged by the attempt to leave the conceptual frame 
within which the experiments have been contextualised and interpreted substantially unmodified. It 
exhibits “varying degrees of departure from the standard model, while still maintaining a somewhat 
similar conception of the decision maker as (imperfect) utility maximizer” (Devetag 1996, p.57). 
From this point of view the emergent perspective in a cognitive approach to economics is rather 
different; it is identified by the search for microfoundations to individual and collective behaviour 
in the functioning mechanisms of the mind. The most significant root of this approach can be found 
in Friedrich A. von Hayek’s work. In 1952 he published “The Sensory Order”
1, a book concerning 
the psychology of perception that, once “rediscovered” by the economists in the early seventies 
(Agonito 1975), became the corner stone of a totally innovative conception of the economic agent, 
no longer anonymous but characterised by his neuronal structure and personal living (Rizzello 
1999). In the ample study that has progressively developed from this text and its implications,  
surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the topic of imagination. It is our aim to outline that, 
on the contrary, it plays a crucial role in the decision-making process. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section two we present a psychological model elaborated by 
Beach and Mitchell (1987), known as “Image Theory”; in section three we show that imagination is 
not a new tool in economics but has received much attention from important economists, among 
which are Boulding and Schakle; in section four an extension of “Image Theory” to economics is 
proposed. We compare an image-based approach with those traditionally recurrent in the literature 
in order to outline the most significant differences; in section five we explore the implications of 
                                                 
1 The author worked on this book for more than twenty years. He argued that mind is a framework that orders 
perceptual stimuli through act of classification and interpretation; the meaning that we attribute to sensorial data 
depends on both the genetic structure of the brain and on personal experience accumulated throughout life: the 
integration of these two factors constitutes the neuropsychological dimension of human diversity. Many recent studies 
have supported Hayek’s ideas (Damasio 1995; Fuster 1997; Paller 2001). our proposal with reference both to the concept of rationality  and to the definition of  economic 
agents. We then summarise the main results. 
 
2. IMAGE THEORY 
 
2.1 A Quick Glance 
 
Image Theory was proposed by the psychologists Beach and Mitchell in the middle 80s as a 
descriptive theory of human decision making in which individual knowledge is represented through 
mental images.  When faced with a decision problem, the decision maker refers to four images: 
1. the  self image which consists of personal values, beliefs, ethics that guide one’s adoption (or 
rejection) of goals  and contribute to the generation of potential new ones; 
2. the  trajectory image which is a mind picture of one’s desirable future, given the self image; 
3. the  action image which basically consists of the plans (intended as sequences of actions) 
currently used by the subject to achieve his goals; 
4. the  projected image, which mirrors the expected future (in terms of the anticipated results of 
plans), if one persists in the plans currently adopted.  
A decision consists of adopting or rejecting new candidates as constitutive elements of one’s images 
(“adoption decision”), or of evaluating whether progress towards goals has been made or not 
(“progress decision”). Decisions are made according to two evaluative criteria, one based on 
compatibility and the other on profitability. As a result of the compatibility test, a candidate is 
rejected for adoption if the number of its violations of the relevant images constituents exceeds a 
subjective rejection threshold: in other words, it is rejected if its compatibility turns out to be too 
low in the personal evaluation of the decision maker. Among the compatible candidates,  the one 
which maximizes the chance to reach the desirable goals is selected: it is in fact the potentially most 
profitable candidate.     
The main contention of Image Theory is that the foundation of individual decision making has to be 
found in the compatibility desire with one’s self-image; this desire causes human actions as much as 
the attempt to avoid self conflict acts as a guideline
2.   
The basic ingredients of a choice problem include individual images and the problem frame. The 
latter is not regarded as exogenous or external to the subject’s mind, nor it is seen as an ad hoc 
conceptualisation built to face the decision  at hand. Its constitutive elements are already included in 
                                                 
2 “Whatever one’s principle may be, they are the foundation of one’s decisions (…). Our contention is that the 
motivation for profit, for gain, for advancement, and the values of outcome that contribute to them derives from the 
degree to which those outcomes promote and comply with the decision maker’s principles. It is compatibility that is the 
key” (Beach 1998, p.9). the decision maker’s mind as parts of his images and undergo a process of selective recalling and 
exploitation. In this phase of creative re-thinking, previously unseen connections among them arise: 
as a result they are reorganized in the new narrative texture which best fits the decision context, 
according to individual interpretation. The endogenous frame which is so generated originates  from 
the images and becomes an instrument that endows the external situation with meanings. 
 
2.2 The Image Theory Subject: a Fuller Inquiry 
 
In Beach and Mitchell’s analysis
3 (1987) many isolated attitudes of the decision maker are 
underlined but a synthetic portrait of his abilities and cognitive features is not explicitly developed. 
According to our interpretations, the “Image Theory’s subject” could be described as follows. 
  He has personal beliefs and basic values that are organised in a network of connections and built 
up over time; those principles are time dependent variables in two main respects, first because they 
appear to be a product of the individual history and, as such, they exhibit path-dependence
4; 
secondly because they can be regarded as dynamic and continually exposed to change. Their   
structure in a specific time point is like a photograph which, from the history flow, extracts an 
instantaneous description of  the developmental stage reached by individual evolution.   
  He uses his imagination at least as much as his rationality. 
  He has reasonable expectations on his future but also desires and dreams about the life he would 
like to be his own one. 
  He has an innate ability to build imaginary scenarios and  to regard himself as a part of them. 
  He is able to change his self image throughout time. 
  He needs “stories” more than single data. In taking a decision he does not examine a list of  
disconnected information but imaginary plots embedded with emotions and affective dispositions. 
  He tries to avoid conflict and to act in coherence with his personal living.         
 
                                                 
3 An interesting extension to organization theory was  proposed by Mitchell, Rediker e Beach (1998) stemming from the 
idea that each organization has its own “identity” and acts to preserve it. From this point of view they share Selznick’s 
following opinion: “The study of institutions is in some ways comparable to the clinical study of personality. In both 
personality and institutions, “self-preservation” means more than bare organic or material survival. Self-preservation 
has to do with the maintenance of basic identity, with the integrity of a personal or institutional “self”.”(1957, p.141). 
Organizational identity, as well as individual identity, can be described with reference to four images: the organizational 
self-image, the organizational trajectory image, the organizational projected image and the organizational action image. 
A relevant meaning is attributed by the authors to the mechanisms of resistance to change, as much as to the role played 
by “doubt” and its appropriate expression in organizational contexts. 
4 Path-dependency is a conceptual category which refines the intuitive idea that “history matters”; it was first found in 
natural history and then extended to social sciences and mainly to economics (David 1985; 1990; 1997; Arthur 1988; 
1989). “This concept implies that every successive act in the development of an individual, an organisation, or an 
institution is strongly influenced by, and dependent on, the path (experience and evolution) previously covered” 
(Rizzello 1997). 2.3 Tests and Experimental Results  
 
As already mentioned, decisions are made on the base of two evaluative criteria, the compatibility 
between candidates and already adopted principles, and the potential profitability expected from 
each of the compatible candidates. Both these criteria are implemented through computational tests. 
The compatibility test can be applied both in the case of an adoption decision and in that of a 
progress decision. In the first situation it evaluates compatibility between the desirable future (as 
mirrored in the trajectory image)  and the future expected as a consequence of the selected plan. The 
logic of the test is the same in both cases and consists in computing the candidate violations to the 
existing images; violations are defined as contradictions, inconsistencies and more generally 
interference with the image’s constituents. The test can be formalized in the following way (Beach 
1998): 
       
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where compatibility I is 0 in the case of no violations and decreases as the number of violations 
increases; t is a candidate feature regarded as significant; c is an element which characterizes  the 
image; V is a violation of c by attribute t; W is the weight  attached to the element c in consideration 
of its subjective relevance. Violations  are in the form all-or-one (-1; 0) and then cannot be graded, 
nor can one violation be compensated by another one. 
When more than one candidate survives screening, the decision maker will select the one which 
offers the highest expected profitability. This second evaluation recalls the traditional choice 
procedure based on the maximization of expected utility but, differently from the latter, it takes 




3. IMAGINATION: A NEW TOOL IN ECONOMICS? 
 
If we look back into the history of economic thought in search of “old roots” for “new 
interpretations” we find that imagination has been included among the basic ingredients of 
economic decisions for more than one century by theorists of world fame (Boulding, March, 
Schakle), although almost completely neglected in the traditional decision-making theory. In a 
recently published article Augier and Kreiner (2000) include imagination among the cognitive 
categories which are relevant in the choice process and analyse its relation with the concept of rationality in Schakle’s, March’s and Simon’s  work. Their investigation has the remarkable merit 
of bringing back an important theme into the debate, but also indicates that many aspects of its link 
with decisional behaviour are still unclear or only intuitively grasped. One author that Augier and 
Kreiner do not take into account is Kenneth Boulding who dedicated an entire  book to the topic. In 
this section we would like to scketch briefly his main ideas and also those of Schakle.  
 
3.1 Time and Imagination in Schakle’s Thought 
 
“Reason unfolds the meaning of the premises. It can do no more” (1972) 
 
According to Shackle, human knowledge is structurally bounded
5: the most significant duty of 
consciousness unfolds in its enrichment, while imagination makes up for its permanent 
insufficiency. In this first meaning, imagination concerns the unknown future or the partially known 
present; we will point out that, as a modality involved in the creation of “visions”, it also concerns 
the past
6, for example when an agent looks back to happened events and organizes them in his own 
picture of “how things have gone”. An analysis of time as an important theoretical concept is the 
main foundation of Shackle’s (1972) critique of neoclassical economics; if the future cannot be 
fully known and foreseen,  instrumentally rational choice turns out to be nonsense
7, as we take  
decision options whose consequences are not predictable into consideration. Therefore, to my 
knowledge choice does not imply the selection of a predetermined scenario among the many 
accessible,  “it consists in first creating, by conjecture and reasoned imagination on the basis of 
mere suggestion offered by visible recorded circumstances, the things on which hope can be 
fixed.(…) Only when novelty is eliminated and all is known can reason  be the sole guide of 
conduct” (Shackle 1972, p.96). This “constructive” approach to choice options is rooted in   
continuos feedback between external (with respect to the decision maker’s mind) data and 
individual expectations, as far as the actual realization of each future event is influenced by its 
previous expectation (Shackle 1972, p.231). 
Although choices mainly take place among imagined experiences, imagination cannot be mistaken 
with pure fantasy, as it is constrained by individual knowledge and individual perception of what 
                                                 
5 “ This insufficiency of knowledge is permanent and part of the nature of things, for consciousness consists precisely in 
the continuos gaining of knowledge. (…) The history-to-come which will flow from men’s decisions is non-existent 
until those decisions themselves are made. What does not exist cannot be known. The future is imagined by each man 
for himself and this process of the imagination is a vital part of the process of decision” (Shackle 1972, p.3). 
6 “Imagination of the future, like imagination of the past, are devices for living in the present” (March 1995, p.427). 
7 “The paradox of rationality is that it must concern itself with choosing amongst things fully known; but in the world of 
time, only this is fully known which is already beyond the reach of choice, having already become actual and thus 
knowable. Rational choice, it seems, must be confined to timeless matters” (Shackle 1972, p.245). may be possible
8. The imaginative process can be broken down into two phases: the first  includes 
the whole flow of thoughts (mainly represented in a visual form) while the second  is based  only  
on those “visions” regarded as being  deemed possible (Shackle 1983).  
In his analysis Shackle develops a concept which appears to be analogous to that, more popular 
among economists, of “bounded rationality”, and that could be defined as “bounded imagination”
9. 
In fact he acknowledges that imagination is a constrained cognitive activity, whose boundaries 
mainly derive from subjective elements, such as  knowledge of external reality, personal principles, 
values and more generally, individual consciousness. 
The choice process can be thought as being structured into the three following steps: at the first, 
sequences of potential actions are imagined; at the second, they undergo a screening process which 
tests their chance to become “real” in the decision maker’s vision of the world (“must be tested for 
possibility”); at the third, each deemed possible sequence is evaluated on the basis of its desirability. 
At that last step, emotions and affect are deeply involved and function as choice criteria: among the 
anticipations of future emotions “attached” to each deemed possible scenario, the one which offers 
“a good state of mind” is selected
10.  
The following aspects of Schakle’s ideas seem of particular relevance to the topic of this paper. 
  Choice is among imagined options. 
  Imagination is bounded. 
  It is used to build choice options. 
  It is constrained by subjective knowledge and interpretation of external reality. 






                                                 
8 “For what does the act of choice do for the chooser? It gives to some, by denying to others, of his work of imagination 
a seriousness, an epistemic standing of a particular kind and quality, it gives them possibility, freedom from known 
obstruction” (Shackle 1983, p.29). 
9 “There are degrees in which imagination can be constrained. With total absence of constraint it is mere fiction, fantasy 
or daydream, claiming no essential relation with the world observed (…). To play its part in decision, imagination must 
be constrained to be congruous with what the decision-maker knows of things in general and of human nature” (Shackle 
1961, p.11). 
10 In Shackle’s words: “A good state of mind, in relation to choice, must be a good state of imagination, a fabric of 
thoughts achieving present, immediate, and synchronous beauty, a whole that satisfies criteria that we must call 
aesthetic” (1979, p.24).    
11 Kenneth E. Boulding (1910-1993) was born in Liverpool but spent  most of his life in the United States. His scientific 
experience originated in the natural sciences, when he was awarded a fellowship in chemistry at New College, Oxford. 
After one year of graduate study he shifted to economics. At first, he worked within the framework of orthodox 
economics, but by 1948 he had dissociated himself from mainstream theories by integrating economic analysis with 
biology and the study of complex systems. Apart from his brilliant academic career, he is author of three books of 
poetry and  was fourtimes nominated for the Nobel price for peace.       
12 For a deeper analysis of this text and its economic implications see Patalano e Rizzello (2000).  
In 1956, after spending eleven months at the Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 
at Stanford University, Boulding wrote “The Image”. This book conceives the role of mental images 
as a filter for perceptual data and mostly as an interface between human perception and knowledge. 
The author’s reflections are referred to biology, economics, political philosophy, organization 
theory, history and sociology, with a chapter devoted to each of those disciplines. As a result, the 
book provides a wide and rich interdisciplinary excursus. 
Every man has a self-image which includes a picture of his location in space, his acknowledgement 
of being part of a time flow, the perception of the universe around him as a world of regularities and 
his feeling of being part of a human relational network. He than has an image to evaluate reality  
(“value image”) which intervenes in his relationship with the external environment embedding 
information with meanings, an “affectional or emotional image” which provides him with feelings, 
attitudes and motivations, and an image concerning the reality degree of his own perceptions. Then 
he has a public image in which he compares his images with collectively shared images at different 
levels of consciousness.  
Knowledge is built up through a process of subjective selection and interpretation of external data, 
whose organizing principle is represented by the image; in this sense it functions as an interface 
between input and output, where the latter can be either new knowledge or action
13. Boulding’s 
interdisciplinary excursus points out some identifying regularities of the image, apart from the 
conceptual context in which it is analysed, mainly its plasticity, its path-dependence and its 
resistance to change. These constitutive features express both its temporary stability and its dynamic 
potentiality at the same time; it contains elements which enhance its evolutionary tendency  as 
much as internal obstacles to its own development. According to Boulding’s ideas, for example, in a 
price system that is characterised by an asymmetrical and incomplete information structure, 
stickiness phenomena can be created by the lack of a clear and widely understandable image of 
what goes on in the market
14. 
In the meanwhile, individual imagery has a relevant social function because it enables collective 
sharing of values and meanings. From this point of view the image has  cohesive power, which may 
acquire a strategic value in organizational contexts and in cooperative interactions. At the same time 
                                                 
13 “…between the incoming and the outcoming messages lies the great intervening variable of the image. The outgoing 
messages are the result of the image, not the result of the incoming messages. The incoming messages only modify the 
outgoing messages as they succed in modifying the image” (Boulding 1956, p.28). 
14“The buyer or seller in an imperfect market drives on a mountain highway where he cannot see more than a few feet 
around each curve; he drives it, moreover, in a dense fog. There is little wonder, therefore, that he tends not to drive it 
all but to stay where he is. The well-known stability or stickiness of prices in imperfect markets may have much more to 
do with the uncertain nature of the image involved than with any ideal of maximizing behavior” (Boulding 1956, p. 85-
86). it may enhance the building of collectively shared expectations about future market performance, to 
the extent to which a society is provided with a widespread informational structure that is able to 
reach a large number of market niches. Those phenomena of cohesion at the imaginative level can, 
however, consolidate existing images thus making them more stable through self-enforcement 
processes, also if they are not adequate to interpret external reality. 
To explain the evolutionary trajectory of the stock of images that exists in society an analysis of 
those factors which exercise their influence on individual imagery is required, as much as an 
understanding of the channels through which they act (e.g. learning processes). This approach 
figures out to be particularly relevant in economic contexts because “the process of reorganization 
of economic images through messages is the key to understand economic dynamics. The great over-
all processes of economic life – inflation, deflation, depression, recovery, and economic 
development - are governed largely by the process of reorganization of economic images through 
the transition of messages.” (p.90). It is not the quantity of information which matters at most, nor 
the speed of its circulation, but the existence of images that are able to get incoming messages 
without strongly resisting to change
15. For example, in the case of technological change the 
innovator takes advantage from the ability to modify his current “vision” of the productive system 
by the introduction of new instruments and tools: not accidentally, the presence of unconventional 
social groups, ethnic minorities, diversified educational systems are generally correlated with an 
increase of the innovative  potential.  
The presence of regularities and constitutive elements in the image underlines its unifying power as 
a concept. In order to develop an interdisciplinary perspective on its meanings and potentialities  






4. DECISION-MAKING MODELS COMPARED 
 
In the neoclassical paradigm, choices are intended as results of a computational process which 
maximizes the expected utility of outcomes that are weighted by their probabilities. As well known, 
                                                 
15 “If a totally new image is to come into being, however, there must be sensitivity to internal messages, the image itself 
must be sensitive to change , must be unstable, and it must include a value image which places high value on trials, 
experiments, and the trying of new things” (Boulding 1956, p.94). 
 this approach involves an axiomatic concept of rationality, according to which rationality is a 
behavioural rule and consists of selecting that strategy which best solves the maximization problem. 
Mathematical foundations of this theory, that we define as “traditional”
16, were provided by von 
Neumann and Morgestern (1944), Debreu (1959), Arrow (1963). 
With the label “non traditional” we rather identify those branches of decision theory that have been 
developed as an alternative to the neoclassical one, both starting from experimental research 
programs and in relation to Herbert Simon’s work and legacy. 
The neoclassical approach to choice processes has been challenged on empirical grounds since the 
axioms of expected utility theory were found to be systematically violated in Allais’s (1953) and 
Ellsberg’s experiments. The major contribution to this field of investigation came from Kahneman 
and Tversky’s work on heuristics (1973, 1974) which led to Prospect Theory (1979). A starting 
point  of this model is the detection of systematic departures from instrumental rationality in 
experimental situations, while  the inclusion of perception among the basic ingredients of choice 
and the consequent relevance of frame in orienting the decision maker’s behaviour are of great 
theoretical importance. 
It was Simon’s work however to introduce a new building block in the analysis, through the concept 
of bounded rationality. Beyond that, and among the numerous achievements of his theoretical work 
in many fields, from artificial intelligence to organizational theory, from problem solving to 
economics, he brought the distinction between external and internal environment into being: the 
former is conceived as a dynamic structure involved in a network of feedback with each individual, 
while the latter is rather the mind space in which information is subjectively elaborated.  
Although very interesting, it is not our present goal to discuss those contributions in depth; in the 
following section we will compare traditional, non traditional and image-based approaches, in order 
to suggest a fuller understanding of their theoretical implications. 
  
                                                 
16 The successive advancements of the theory are not relevant to our discussion in this paper. In fact they left the 
assumptions that we take in consideration substantially unmodified, mainly the strong informative requirements and the 
anonymity of the agents. 4.1 Conceptual and strategic differences 
 
The most significant difference between the image based approach, IT, traditional decision-making, 
TDM, and non traditional decision theories, NTDM, may be found in the decision maker’s 
description. To support our hypothesis we will compare these approaches with reference to five 
main conceptual categories: decisional mechanisms; choice criteria; context influence; relevance of 
past experiences; space for individuality. 
 
1. Decisional Mechanisms 
TDM: the representative agent is provided with an abstract decisional mechanism, maximization of 
utility, and with the “instruments” needed to apply it: perfectly distributed information, instrumental 
rationality and unlimited computational abilities. When the maximization procedure is used, it leads 
to an optimal choice whose subsequent traslation from the abstract model to the external 
environment  is identified with taking the best possible action. 
NTDM: the decision maker has incomplete information, limited computational abilities and 
bounded rationality. He is influenced by the modality and channels of information trasmission, and 
starting from external data, develops his knowledge through a personal and context dependent 
mental process. His choices are sub-optimal but “satisficing”, in accordance with a subjective and 
changeable aspiration threshold.  
IT: the decision maker hasn’t got any abstract decisional rule, but only a bunch of principles that are  
developed through learning and personal experiences regarding his own living and are stratified 
over time in his self-image. He works on external data by including them in mental representations; 
through this adaptation process of  already existing cognitive structures to new incoming messages 
he builds up his knowledge; his own network of goals, plans and beliefs that can be recalled either 
by external stimuli, e.g. a new option to act, or internal ones, e.g. the perception of a discrepancy 
between expected and effective achievements of his performed plans. From this recalling, a search 
for the solution which best fits his images begins.  
 
2. Choice Criteria 
TDM: constrained maximization of expected utility. 
NTDM: search  mainly based on heuristics; breakdown of the original task into  sub-problems that 
can be solved independently; exploitation of already experimented routines or attempts to develop 
new ones. IT: two criteria are subsequently applied: according to the compatibility rule those principles, goals 
and plans that are most compatible with existing images are selected, while the profitability test 
leads the subject to choose the candidate from which the greatest closeness to desirable goals is 
expected among compatible ones.   
 
3. Context Dependence 
TDM: the maximization procedure is abstract and independent from the decision content, it can be 
used in every situation and can be perfectly transferred from one context to another.  
NTDM: the behavioural routines are selected case by case, according to the decision-at-hand 
requirements, and then they exhibit strong  context dependence; the chance of partial transfer is due 
to their adaptability from experimented situations to analogous ones.  
IT: each situation may activate different working images or connections among them, and so 
choices appear to be strongly dependent on context and  weakly transferable. 
 
4. Past Experiences 
TDM: personal history has no relevance at all because the decisional mechanism does not depend 
on individuality, is completely anonimous and does not change over time. Experience already 
acquired is not linked to decisional skills, it could exist in somebody else’s mind and be transmitted 
to the decision maker in the form of new information. 
NTDM:  external stimuli are subjectively interpreted and the building up of knowledge is 
essentially based on the interaction between mental schemes and experience. This explains why, 
also if provided with the same information, individuals would come to diversified knowledge: 
decisions are strongly path-dependent as much as the mental schemes are and so are even the neural 
maps which contribute to them.    
IT: personal experience represents the cognitive and affective background in which the image 
generation  is rooted: the whole decision process depends on it.  
 
5. Space for Individuality 
TDM: the link between choices and personal values is not a direct one, it reveals itself through 
individual preferences which are however considered as exogenous. Agents can be totally replaced 
by each other and their subjectivity has no place if not as a list of data. 
NTDM: information processing, choice of heuristics and frame building are embedded with 
individuality as are the choices which follow from them. IT: images are an individual resource and their generation also involves unconscious elements 
which are subjective; on the other hand, image components are mainly connected by affective and 
emotional links. The theory makes explicit reference to personal beliefs, desires, motivations and 
goals. Relationships among those constitutive elements are strongly endogenous. 
 
 
5. HOMO OECONOMICUS CAN BUILD UP IMAGES: WHAT ELSE MAY CHANGE IN THE 
“THEORY” 
 
5.1 Imagination and Rationality 
 
According to Schakle we choose among images because it’s always too late to choose among facts. 
As a consequence of the impossibility of knowing the future in advance, choices take place among 
expected experiences. On the other hand imagination is a bounded activity and is constrained by the 
agent’s knowledge, principles and desires. The concept of “bounded imagination” has an intriguing 
affinity with the decisional criteria that are provided by the Image Theory; according to this, 
decisions are taken through a process of screening and evaluation of imagined scenarios. The main 
claim of this theory is that individual decision-making is guided by the desire of compatibility with 
one’s own principles and by the attempt to minimize conflict with one’s self-image that is built up 
over time and always exposed to change. The concept of “bounded imagination” suggests 
integration with that, much more famous, of  “bounded rationality”. Along this line of thought,  
Image Theory leads one to reconsider the concept of rationality by outlining the close link that 
exists between rationality and imagination, when the former is intended in a sense broader than that 
which is traditionally in fashion among economists. From this point of view, the introduction of 
imagination among the basic ingredients of decision-making does not drive us to a setting that is 
populated by fantasy-drawn agents, instead of rational subjects, but rather it suggests a broadening 
of the cognitive substrates on which logic can exert its influence. It does this by including a set of 
imagined scenarios in the “traditional” list of informational data. Upon this set that is built up by the 
agent, logic intervenes to select one among the possible choice options. Far from discharging  the 
cognitive value of rationality, the analysis of imagination stresses the theoretical significance of its 
revaluation, by making the limits of a concept that is bent over itself and inadequate to express the 
multifunctional meaning of human thought evident, such as that of instrumental rationality, evident.  
It’s not the necessary however to create a new ad-hoc category which eventually suits decision-
making theories, but rather to enforce the communication channels between economics and other disciplines, such as psychology, where wider concepts of rationality are commonly used 
(Galimberti 1999). We consider this to be an important challenge for economic theory  which 
deserves more investigation.  
 
5.2 “Cognitive” Agents 
The exploration of the cognitive dimension at the roots of decision-making is a fascinating research 
topic that has widened, and still promises to increase, our knowledge of the channels through which 
mind and society interact. In non-traditional decision theories, much effort has been devoted both to 
the analysis of information representation  and to its processing, elaboration and retrieval.  
Our claim is that the discovery of specific roles for mental images, in addition to those played by 
other representational formats –such as schema, scripts, mental models-, adds substantial 
clarification to our notion of a “cognitive” agent. By the term “cognition” we make general 
reference to the mechanisms of mind functioning, both conscious or unconscious ones. Therefore 
many different psychic phenomena can be included among its “objects”, in particular perception, 
imagination, motivation, learning, creation of new knowledge, emotions, intentionality, but also 
reactions that are performed out of awareness.  
A “cognitive” agent  can be identified with a subject that is endowed with mental representations 
that guide his behaviour. More specifically: 
  he builds up representations of the world in which he leaves and of his desires and his 
intentions, by using means and formats which include propositions, schemas and images; 
   he has personal beliefs  that are partially organised into coherent systems, his theories; 
  he acts on the basis of his mental representations in a double sense. Both because his goals and 
plans are influenced by the contents and the format of his representation, and because his behaviour 
is oriented towards the achievement of goals that have been pre-represented in his mind 
(“representation-driven behavior”, Castelfranchi 2002); 
  he acts in contexts which exhibit structural uncertainty.  
In this conceptual framework, Boulding’s idea that “behaviour depends on the image” acquires a 
clearer meaning, and can be connected to the relationship between images and actions that are 
postulated by the Image Theory. On the other hand the mind of Homo Oeconomicus  gains a wider 
description, in which rationality and imagination deeply interact. 
    
5.3 Some Methodological Implications 
The inclusion of mental images among the representational formats of economic agents has some 
methodological implications which seem to be very remarkable. A first interesting topic is the one connected to the existence of different levels of reality; this is not however a “new” and unexpected 
discovery. Hayek (1952) drew a clear distinction between the microcosmos, specifically our mind 
environment, and the macrocosmos, e.g. the external reality, and stressed the necessity of 
investigating their relationships. Simon (2000) spoke even more explicitly of an “inner 
environment” that is crucial to understanding decision-making, at least as much as the external one. 
Both those positions make a distinction between the psychic and neurofisiological reality of the 
subject, and the world in which he performs his actions. As mentioned above, this conceptualisation 
is relevant to our definition of a “cognitive” agent and endows the attempt to discover cognitive 
foundations for economic phenomena with meaning. 
The debate on the possible degrees of realism in economic analysis is structurally connected to the 
existence of different reality levels. In the famous Friedman’s words “…the more significant the 
theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions” (1953, p.14); as it is well known, this position is 
based on the idea that the success of a theory derives from its predictive power. To make succesfull 
predictions we do not need realistic hypothesis but subjects that behave “as if” they were such. In 
the economic literature the expression “as if” has been the centre of a wide debate that we cannot 
consider in this paper. We simply aim to outline on which methodological approach an extension of 
Image Theory to economics could be based, and in which sense it may differ from Friedman’s 
position. 
If realism is meant in the sense of hypotheses that sharply reflect  effective individual behaviour, we 
do not think that a realistic theory does exist; each model is in fact an abstraction, needs 
simplification, and cannot trace a true picture of the way reality is. A more interesting problem 
concerns which aspects of reality are judged to be relevant in a specific research program and which  
are not
17. 
Our methodological position widely recalls Hayek’s  (Carabelli e De Vecchi, 2000): 
  we don’t assign any priority to empirical observation: each  theory is in fact a thought product 
and, as such, cannot be founded on the simple detection of empirical regularities;  
  the main “instruments” with which economists work are not rough data nor physical objects but 
rather beliefs, expectations and mental dispositions of the agents about themselves and others, that 
lead to specific actions; 
                                                 
17 “The issue is not about realisticness versus unrealisticness in the abstract; each of the rival approach produces 
theories and models that are inescapably unrealistic. The issue is rather about the functions of unrealisticness in the 
orientation of theorizing (…); we need principles for assessing theories on the basis of how close they come to 
capturing the essential aspects of the economy for given explanatory purposes” (Mäki 1994, p.253).   scientific research, and then economic analysis, aims at predicting events on one hand and at 
increasing our comprehension of phenomena at different depth levels on the other (Popper 1969; 
trad. it. 1991, p.57-59). 
Unlike the traditional approach, the extension of Image Theory to decision making in economic 
contexts is not normative; it does not aim at building an abstract model of choice in ideal 
conditions, nor at constructing a theoretical benchmark with reference to which eventual deviations 
could be measured. From this point of view, it turns out to be rather inefficient when meant as an 
instrument that predicts economic behaviour. However we do think it can represent something else 
and something more. 
An important clue originates from the surprisingly restricted interpretation that the concept of 
“prediction” seems to have undergone in the literature on economic methodology. Its meaning 
could be enriched if we consider that, besides predictions of events included in well known 
categories, there also exists a prediction of new categories of events. If we mean theories as 
predictive instruments in Friedman’s sense, we limit their potential influence to predictions of the 
first kind; to predict new classes of events in fact they need to be instruments of discovery. Image 
Theory cannot be used to measure the expected values of numerical variables nor to predict their 
future trend in statistical terms, but it can help to understand which phenomena are NOT likely to 
happen if a subject is endowed with certain images. In this sense, the object of prediction is shifted 
from numerical values to those connections between events which cannot  be reasonably expected. 
If interpreted as a source of “negative” predictions, e.g. knowledge concerning what is not likely to 
happen, the theory is “open” to discoveries and a can help  to detect novelties. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The economic literature on decision-making has recently contributed in integrating achievements 
made in different disciplinary fields, experimental economics, cognitive psychology, neurosciences, 
artificial intelligence, within a unique approach that is known as cognitive economics. Its research 
program aims at finding foundations for individual and collective behaviour in the functioning 
mechanisms of the mind. 
Within this approach, however, an analysis of the roles played by imagination is still missing. Such 
a topic is surprisingly neglected  although it was once largely investigated by well known 
economists, such as Boulding and Schakle. In Simon’s work on problem-solving, imagination is 
conceived as an instrument which helps to fill the informative gaps about the unknowable future. In our opinion this way of dealing with the topic is too restricted; as highlighted by Image Theory, 
imagination has much more substantial functions, most of all that of minimizing cognitive and 
emotional conflict.   
In keeping with this result, our extension of Beach’s and Mitchell’s (1987) model to economic 
theory indicates that solutions to problems, research paths and obstacles to their detection are 
“hidden” in the individual and collective images. Only those solutions which show that are 
compatible with existing images are selected and evaluated on the grounds of their expected 
profitability. This situation in which each individual tends to make the choices which appear to be 
the most compatible with his personal history can be assimilated to a sort of temporary equilibrium. 
In the long run, the feedback with the external environment and the structural plasticity of the 
human mind may sharply modify the existing images, and eventually, individual perspectives on 
external world may evolve in a direction which cannot be predicted in advance. Such a 
representation of the choice process is not normative, does not aim at producing an ideal picture of 
the decision-maker, but tends to describe which variables are most likely to constrain his behaviour 
and through which channels they can exert their influence.    
With reference to the two main paradigms traditionally taken into account by the literature, both the 
neoclassical one and the one originated by Simon’s work, an image-based approach may 
significantly change the representation of the decision-making processes, but it also suggests a 
development of a richer theoretical perspective on the concepts of rationality and economic agent. 
The first one can better qualify the multifunctional meaning of human reasoning when seen in 
dynamic connection with the concept of imagination. From this point of view, economics could 
largely benefit from conceptual exchanges with other disciplines in which extended concepts of 
rationality already exist, such as psychology. 
The analysis of imagining also allows a deeper understanding of the concept of a differentiated 
cognitive agent, as initially shaped by Hayek. Among the mental representations that drive his 
behaviour we can in fact include images as cognitive substrates which possess their own symbolic 
autonomy and enable a further modality of knowledge representation. As a consequence of image 
pathdependence, the individuality of the economic agent is then enriched and actually represents a 
crucial endogenous element of the choice process.  REFERENCES 
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